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Abstract
The article dwells on the conflict of views between the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and the Italian Constitutional Court on the issue of possible exceptions to
state immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic courts. This author focuses
specifically on the so-called ‘last resort’ argument and argues that a type of ‘jurisdic-
tion by necessity’ should be exercised by domestic courts in cases where there is no
other forum in which victims of the most serious violations of international law
committed by a state could reasonably seek redress. The exception to state immunity
would apply in residual cases, precisely where no other option than adjudication
before a foreign domestic court is available. In the last part of the article, the poten-
tial impact of Judgment No. 238 of 2014 handed down by the Italian
Constitutional Court on the evolution of international law is taken into account.
1. Introduction
Readers may be wondering why I chose this odd title to epitomize my reflec-
tions on Judgment No. 238 of 2014 by the Italian Constitutional Court on the
immunities of states.1 In fact, the title of this article derives from a verse from
a Bob Dylan song entitled ‘Most Likely You Go Your Way and I’ll Go Mine’,
which came to my mind right after I read Judgment No. 238 for the first time.
The song narrates two people who do not understand each other and
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eventually break apart and head in different directions. In my opinion, the
song represents well the position taken by the Constitutional Court in oppos-
ition to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)2 on the issue of state immunity
in the belief that, in the long term, events will prove its position as the correct
one.
A clear ambition of Judgment No. 238 that is brought to light is to set a prece-
dent for the development of international law in the field of state immunity. It
is, therefore, appropriate to dwell on the extent to which this attempt is
soundly argued as well as on the repercussions it may have on future cases
and the evolution of the law of state immunity. The objective of the
Constitutional Court may not appear, at a first glance, to constitute an attempt
to mould customary international law ç of course it cannot technically be
defined as such ç nonetheless, the Court’s intention to reassess the contours
of the international customary rule of state immunity emerges throughout its
reasoning.3
The judges of the Constitutional Court, for the first time, apply the theory
of ‘counter-limits’ and engage in a delicate balancing of those interests and
values at stake.While not overtly contesting the interpretation of the rule of
immunity given by the ICJ, the Constitutional Court affirms not only that ‘ju-
dicial protection of fundamental rights is one of the supreme principles of
the constitutional order’,4 but also that the right to access justice ‘became a
cornerstone of the international system of protection of human rights’.5 The
Constitutional Court devotes a significant part of Judgment No. 238 to the
crucial role of domestic courts in setting aside the doctrine of absolute im-
munity at the beginning of 20th century, concluding that, in the case at
issue: ‘The result is a further reduction of the scope of this norm, with effects
in the domestic legal order only. At the same time, however, this may also
contribute to a desirable ç and desired by many ç evolution of international
law itself.’6
The Constitutional Court should be commended for not avoiding the task of
trying to attain a proper balance between those values and interests at stake
2 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3
February 2012 (hereinafter ‘Jurisdictional Immunities of the State’).
3 Some commentators argued that the Constitutional Court only framed the issue of state im-
munity under a domestic law perspective and reached the conclusion that primacy ought to
be conferred on the right to a judicial remedy over the rule on state immunity confining ‘itself
to deploy judicial authority in foro domestico’. Since the Constitutional Court did not try to per-
suade the international community about the soundness of its conclusion under international
law, the Court cannot have successfully attained this objective. F. Fontanelli,
‘Damage-assessment on the Building of International Law after the Italian Constitutional
Court’s Decision No. 238 of 2014: No Structural Damage, Just Wear and Tear’,Verfaassungsblog,
15 December 2014, available online at http://verfassungsblog.de/damage-assessment-build-
ing-international-law-italian-constitutional-courts-decision-no-238-2014-no-structural-dam-
age-just-wear-tear-2/ (visited 8 April 2016).
4 Judgment No. 238, x3.4.
5 Ibid., x 3.1.
6 Ibid., x 3.3.
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in the case before it and for making choices between conflicting rules, a task
often carefully avoided by other courts confronted with the same issue.7 In par-
ticular, one of the merits of Judgment No. 238 stands in bringing to light the
strength of the so-called ‘forum of last resort’argument.
2. On the Merits of the ‘Forum of Last Resort’Argument
In Judgment No. 238, the Constitutional Court expressly focuses on the conse-
quences of granting immunity to a state in situations and cases where vic-
tims have no other effective remedy available. The Constitutional Court
clearly states that the ‘sacrifice’ of the right to a judicial remedy in that case,
namely, to obtain compensation, is ‘absolute’, and cannot be accepted because
the serious violations that are at stake in this case breach fundamental
rights, and alternative means of redress or remedy do not exist. In similar
cases, in which a state recognizes that serious international crimes have
been committed and its responsibility and, in addition, the state admits that
the victims who filed the complaints received no compensation ç precisely
the facts as they relate to Germany in those domestic cases where state im-
munity was denied before Italian courts, the ‘last resort’ argument is
convincing.
In evaluating state immunity against the backdrop of victims’ right to access
justice, the Constitutional Court does not stand alone. The availability of alter-
native means of redress is taken into consideration in several other decisions
by domestic courts. In fact, the ‘last resort’ argument features prominently in
most of the decisions recalled by the ICJ in its 2012 Jurisdictional Immunities
Judgment as a solid basis for the conclusions reached by the Court. For in-
stance, in the 2010 Natoniewski Judgment, the Polish Supreme Court recog-
nized the lack of jurisdiction on the basis of state immunity enjoyed by
Germany. However, the judges engaged in a balancing test based on jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) inWaite and Kennedy
7 Principally referring to the ICJ, which restated that, in its view, there is no conflict between the
substantial rules protecting fundamental rights and the procedural rule granting state immun-
ity from foreign jurisdiction. It is also appropriate here to refer to judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 35763/97,
Judgment of 21 November 2001; and, more recently, Jones and others v. The United Kingdom,
Appl. Nos 34356/06 and 40528/06, Judgment of 14 January 2014. According to the ECtHR, the
grant of state immunity does not impose a disproportionate restriction on the right of access
to a court, and thus, does not violate Art. 6 ECtHR, simply because it pursues the legitimate
aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between
states. The tautology of this argument is apparent and it divests the proportionality test of any
meaning. Furthermore, it is troubling that this reasoning comes from a human rights court as
it effectively sanctions the application of a procedural bar to claims based on possible human
rights violations for the sake of protecting state sovereignty exactly when what is at stake is
the application of international rules aimed at protecting individuals from the abuses of
power and state sovereignty.
‘TimeWill TellWho Just Fell andWho’s Been Left Behind’ 3 of 8
 by guest on M
ay 24, 2016
http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
v. Germany,8 which concluded that there is no disproportionate restriction on
the right of access to court if the applicants have available reasonable alterna-
tive means to effectively protect their rights.9 The same can be said about the
less recent judgment ç cited as well by the ICJ ç handed down by the
Slovenian Constitutional Court, in which the judges recognized that granting
of immunity must be balanced by the existence of other possible means of re-
dress. The Slovenian Constitutional Court affirmed:
On the other hand, the complainant is not deprived by the challenged rulings of all judicial
protection, but only of such before domestic courts. ::: The Constitutional Court also con-
sidered in reviewing proportionality in the narrow sense that the matter concerned the
state in which general standards on human rights protection and the principles of a state
governed by the rule of law have been adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe,
and that the decisions of its courts are subject to review by institutions which operate at
the level of this international organization.10
In this case, the judges also took into consideration the theoretical possibility of
recourse to the ECtHR against a German judgment following the exhaustion
of domestic remedies.11
Other judgments could be mentioned, but the case law cited is sufficient as a
basis for some further observations on the ‘forum of last resort’ argument. On
the one hand, these cases show that often domestic courts do engage in a bal-
ancing test before deciding whether or not to grant immunity to a foreign
state ç a test that evaluates the existence of alternatives avenues for the vic-
tims to have access to justice and, consequently, to request compensation. It
also indicates that, in adopting this approach, domestic judges often do recog-
nize the existence of state immunity; however, this is because they trust the
willingness of other competent judges to exercise their jurisdiction either in
order to pronounce on individual complaints or to settle an interstate dispute.
Thus, how should situations be assessed where every other competent body
refused to grant access to redress to victims of the most serious international
crimes?
The position that immunity shall be set aside in cases where states fail to
provide adequate remedies to victims of the most serious crimes, which
would only occur in residual cases, seems the best possible solution, for adop-
tion on a case-by-case basis. This would, at least partially, stabilize the
unsettled relationship between state immunity, on the one side, and the
8 Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Appl. No. 26083/94, Judgment of 18 February 1999.
9 The Supreme Court decision of 29 October 2010, Ref. No. IV CSK 465/09 in the case brought by
Winicjusz N. against the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Chancellery for payment,
XXX Polish Yearbook of International Law (2010) 299^303, available online at http://www.eui.
eu/Projects/CentreForJudicialCooperation/Documents/2012-05-25-26/Natoniewski2010(SCjudge-
ment)PYIL2010.pdf (visited 8 April 2016).
10 Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court, 8 March 2001, available online at http://odlo
citve.us-rs.si/en/odlocitev/AN02273 (visited 8 April 2016).
11 On this point, see L. Gradoni and A. Tanzi, ‘Immunita' dello Stato e crimini internazionali tra
consuetudine e bilanciamento: note critiche a margine della sentenza della Corte internazio-
nale di giustizia del 3 febbraio 2012’, 67 La Comunita' Internazionale (2012) 203.
4 of 8 JICJ (2016)
 by guest on M
ay 24, 2016
http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
right of victims of international crimes to obtain compensation, on the other.
A residual exception to state immunity would push states to ensure the avail-
ability and adequacy of remedies in the state allegedly responsible or to
reach settlement on compensation at the interstate level. Indeed, it seems
that the threat of a myriad of lawsuits did prompt some states to admit their
liability towards individuals who suffered serious human rights violations
and to award compensation for damages in cases where they initially re-
buffed this possibility. The results obtained by the Holocaust Restitution
Movement by securing compensation for wartime ‘labour slaves’ provide a
telling example. In 2001, following a significant number of compensation
claims filed in US courts, Germany entered into agreements establishing
funds for ‘labour slaves’. These agreements are exceptional in providing for
voluntary payments by Germany, which, however, has accepted them as
binding commitments. The then German Chancellor acknowledged that the
threat of American litigation eventually acted as the impetus for the estab-
lishment by Germany of compensations schemes.12
In situations where the recognition of state immunity totally deprives the
claimants of their fundamental rights, it is appropriate to search for a re-
sidual solution and, at this stage of the development of law in this field, the
more balanced answer could lie in a doctrine of ‘jurisdiction by necessity’.
This solution would allow states to exercise their jurisdiction and to withhold
state immunity in cases where serious crimes involving human rights viola-
tions have been committed, no compensation was granted to the victims,
and where no alternative mechanism is available or reasonably foreseeable
to obtain redress.
The doctrine of the forum of necessity (forum necessitatis) mainly applies in
the private international law sphere and it serves the purpose of avoiding a
denial of justice.13 A domestic court may assume jurisdiction, even when it
lacks a real and substantial connection to the case, where no other compe-
tent body is available to adjudicate a claim. In one of the clearest enunci-
ations of the doctrine, a Court of Appeal in Ontario framed the doctrine as a
12 ‘German Companies Adopt Fund For Slave Laborers Under Nazis’, NewYork Times, 17 February
1999. See also for the elimination of hurdles to compensation, ‘Germany to compensate Nazi
slave-labourers’,The Telegraph, 31 May 2001.
13 Scholars identified the doctrine’s first formal adoption in Art. 2 Inter-American Convention on
Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments,
which provides: ‘The requirements for jurisdiction in the international sphere shall also be
deemed to be satisfied if, in the opinion of the judicial or other adjudicatory authority of the
State Party in which the judgment is to be given effect, the judicial or other adjudicatory au-
thority that rendered the judgment assumed jurisdiction in order to avoid a denial of justice be-
cause of the absence of a competent judicial or other adjudicatory authority.’ See C. Nwapi,
‘Jurisdiction by Necessity and the Regulation of the Transnational Corporate Actor’, 30 Utrecht
Journal of International and European Law (2014) 24, at 31 et seq.
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jurisdictional corrective applicable to cases ‘where there is no other forum in
which the plaintiff could reasonably seek relief’.14
The basic idea of jurisdiction by necessity is that there must be at least one
forum somewhere to adjudicate every claim. In the words of the Canadian
judges: ‘ the overriding concern for access to justice ::: motivates the assump-
tion of distinction.’ With the respective differences to be taken into account,
it may be contended that, in cases where a claim before a domestic court
proves the only feasible avenue to ascertain state responsibility for a grave
breach of international law and to secure an effective remedy to the victims,15
the lifting of state immunity before foreign domestic courts should be con-
sidered as a corrective action to avoid denial of justice. The exception to
state immunity would apply in residual cases, more precisely, in those cases
where no other option than adjudication before a foreign domestic court is
available.16
3. Could Judgment No. 238 Have an Impact on the
Development of an Exception to the Rule
of State Immunity?
It is difficult to predict whether, in the long run, Judgment No. 238 could have
an impact on the formation of an exception to state immunity in cases invol-
ving alleged international crimes. For the moment, this seems unlikely.
However, hopefully, it will reopen the debate on the issue of the forum of last
resort, an aspect completely overlooked by the ICJ, and potentially pave the
way for, at least, a residual exception. Three Judges of the ICJ expressed their
support for an exception to state immunity based on the forum of last resort
in their separate or dissenting opinions appended to the Jurisdictional
Immunities Judgment. Judge Yusuf noted that ‘immunity should not be an
14 Van Breda v.Village Resorts Ltd, Ontario Court of Appeals, 2 February 2010 states: ‘The forum of
necessity doctrine recognizes that there will be exceptional cases where, despite the absence
of a real and substantial connection, the need to ensure access to justice will justify the as-
sumption of jurisdiction. The forum of necessity doctrine does not redefine real and substantial
connection to embrace ‘‘forum of last resort’’ cases; it operates as an exception to the real and
substantial connection test.Where there is no other forum in which the plaintiff can reason-
ably seek relief, there is a residual discretion to assume jurisdiction. In my view, the overriding
concern for access to justice that motivates the assumption of jurisdiction despite inadequate con-
nection with the forum should be accommodated by explicit recognition of the forum of neces-
sity exception rather than by distorting the real and substantial connection test’ (emphasis
added).
15 Redress for victims plays an essential part in the enforcement of the consequences of the
breach, which entails compliance with the obligation of reparation.
16 The idea of a sort of ‘jurisdiction by necessity’, which would be exercised in residual cases in
order to grant a remedy to victims of the most serious violations of international law was al-
ready put forward in M. Frulli, ‘When Are States Liable towards Individuals for Serious
Violations of Humanitarian Law? The Markovic¤ Case’, 1 Journal of International Criminal
Justice (JICJ) (2003) 406.
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obstacle to such reparation in those exceptional circumstances where no other
means of redress is available. This is a very limited exception to immunity
bounded by the special circumstances arising from the lack of other remedial
avenues for the victims’. Judge Canc ado Trindade stressed even more on this
point by emphasizing the existence of an individual right to compensation.
Judge Bennouna, while agreeing with the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment,
supported a narrow exception to state immunity ‘when a State presumed to
be the author of unlawful acts rejects any engagement of its responsibility, in
whatever form’, in order to enable victims to exercise their right to ‘access to
justice in their own country’.17
It should not be excluded that Judgment No. 238 may be used as a compass
by other courts deciding to engage in a balancing test, which takes into consid-
eration the lack of adequate remedies as a factor to tip the scale in favour of
denying state immunity. This would require great caution on how the balan-
cing would function in practice,18 but since the evaluation should be made on
a case-by-case basis, a universal remedy cannot be expected. A crucial point,
for instance, would be whether and how diplomatic protection and interstate
compensation settlements would form part of alternative remedies.19 However,
there is no obligation on states to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of
their nationals; commonly victims have no avenue to place pressure on their
state to negotiate a compensation agreement (other than filing a judicial
claim against a foreign state, who may decide not to avail itself of its immun-
ity). Even if the state chooses to take up the victim’s claim of reparation for
international crimes, the claim is that of the state and not the individual.20
Thus, the state is not obliged to pass on to the individual victim any compensa-
tion obtained. It should be recalled that states are reluctant to exercise diplo-
matic protection. Hence, there are several reasons for preferring a judicial
remedy in cases where no compensation was granted.21
What about a more profound impact of Judgment No. 238 on the evolution of
international law in the field of state immunity? The Constitutional Court was
aware that its position is not in line with the current customary regime on state
immunity; however, the judges clearly advocate a shift, perceived ç by the Court
17 See Separate Opinion of Judge Bennouna, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, x15; Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Yusuf, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, x 42; Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Canc ado Trindade, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State.
18 A. Gattini,‘The Dispute on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State before the ICJ: Is the Time Ripe
for a Change in the Law?’ 24 Leiden Journal of International Law (2011) 173. Gattini elaborates
on the difficulties of determining the availability of an alternative forum.
19 See L. McGregor, ‘State Immunity and Human Rights: Is There a Future after Germany v. Italy?’
11 JICJ (2013) 125, on the opportunity for national courts to elaborate tests to determine the
availability of alternative remedies.
20 Case concerning Ahmadou Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo),
Judgment of 30 November 2010, xx160^161.
21 Contra P. Palchetti, ‘Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court: In Search of aWay
Out’, Questions of International Law, QIL, Zoom out II (2014) 44.
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itself ç as being imposed by a widespread opinio necessitatis.While the prevailing
trend is to uphold immunity notwithstanding the gravity of the violations at
stake, there is a contextual and growing perception of the non-derogable nature
of the right to a judicial remedy. Domestic and international cases exist that con-
sider the right of access to justice as the crucial factor in reaching a specific out-
come, even notwithstanding an existing contrasting obligation.22 Time will tell.
22 I am referring to the well-known Kadi I and Kadi II cases: European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber),
Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission (Joined Cases
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P), Judgment of 3 September 2008; Court of Justice of the European
Union, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Council of the European Union v.
Yassin Abdullah Kadi (Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P), Judgment of 18 July 2013.
I am also referring toAl-Dulimi case before the ECtHR although in a different framework: Al-Dulimi
and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 5809/08, Judgment of 26 November 2013.
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